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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") has been
a focal point in international trade relations and law for over forty
years. A creation of the post-World War II era, GATT was designed to
satisfy the trade needs of the developed countries, particularly the
United States. The developing countries were largely ignored during
the initial stages of GATT, and did not gain bargaining power until the
mid- 1970s.
This article analyzes GATT's role in promoting or neglecting the
trade objectives of the developing countries, mainly those in Asia and
Africa. The first section traces the evolution of GATT. The second sec-
tion addresses devices for regulating trade and their effect on develop-
ing countries with respect to commodities, textiles, and related prod-
ucts. The third section examines how the political forces within the
developing countries have affected GATT. The fourth section analyzes
proposals from the recent Uruguay Round. The article concludes with
an analysis of GATT's role in the future.
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I. EvOLUTION OF GATT
Developing countries were not a powerful bargaining force in the
formulation of the legal rules of GATT. The Depression of the 1920s
and 1930s, "Beggar-thy-neighbor" policies followed by Western Euro-
pean countries, and the Second World War left an unsettling array of
economic conditions in the late 1940s. The victors of World War II, the
United States and Western Europe, with the United Kingdom leading
the European bloc, decided to enact a multilateral forum to propagate
"free trade" throughout the world to avoid the economic mistakes of
the first half of the twentieth century.' The principles of international
trade formulated during the Havana Conference were adopted as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on January 1, 1948.
When the United States drafted its proposal for a postwar trade
policy, it included only three economic development exceptions to "free
trade": the right to protect infant industries by raising "bound" tariffs;
the imposition of quantitative restrictions; and the securing of preferen-
tial tariffs from other developed or developing countries.'
While the United States espoused free trade for other contracting
parties, it requested free trade exceptions for the benefit of developed
country producers.3 These exceptions included the right to implement
export subsidies for agricultural commodities and the right to use quan-
titative restrictions on agricultural imports." Britain and France's de-
mands to retain tariff preferences for their colonies and ex-colonies, as
well as the right to use discriminatory restrictions to cope with balance
of payments problems, were also accepted into GATT's structure.5
During the first decade of GATT, special provisions were not included
to address the peculiar needs of the developing countries. This forced
developing countries to request waivers from the GATT rules., Devel-
oping countries were often required to use formal GATT procedures at
times when formalities were not required of the developed nations. For
example, Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) requested formal waivers in
1952. The GATT Working Party not only insisted that Sri Lanka fol-
low formal procedures, but also required it to withdraw some of its
1. See S. GOLT, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS 1986-90: ORIGINS, IssuEs & PROS-
PECTS 2 (1988) [hereinafter GOLT].
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 16.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 30-31.
7. See id. at 30-31. Until 1983, developing country waivers accounted for 116 of
the 169 waiver decisions, in comparison to only 51 waivers for developed countries. Id.
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original requests.' The Sri Lankan delegation made a statement that
the stringency of the review procedure under Article XVIII nearly de-
stroyed the benefit it sought to confer.'
As the 1960s approached, the number of developing country mem-
bers in GATT increased. 10 However, their behavior as a bloc was not
yet seen as a major force in implementing rules beneficial to developing
countries." Meanwhile, the Soviet Union attempted to organize a rival
trade organization within the United Nations: the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).' 2
As a result of this atmosphere, the major trading partners con-
vened a ministerial meeting in 1957.13 The Ministers cited three major
problems affecting developing countries: excessive short-term fluctua-
tions in the prices of primary products; failure of the developing coun-
tries' trade to grow as rapidly as developed countries' trade; and wide-
spread resort to agricultural protection.'- They recognized that the
developing countries had no real bargaining power to negotiate lower
tariffs'" and identified two types of discrimination - origin-based dis-
crimination'" and discrimination on the basis of the degree of
processing. 7
As a result of these findings, in 1961, contracting parties to GATT
made'a Declaration for the Promotion of Trade in Less Developed
8. Id. at 25.
9. Id.
10. By 1970, there were 77 GATT signatories, 52 of which were developing coun-
tries. Id. at 24.
11. Id. at 39.
12. Id. at 39-40.
13. Id. at 41.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 229-30.
16. Id.; see, e.g., T. MURRAY, TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
10 (1977) [hereinafter MURRAY] The United Kingdom and France violated the GATT
non-discrimination principle whenever it suited their political interests. The Common-
wealth Preference Area, Free Union of the European Economic Community (EC),
Africal Association Agreements under the Yaounde' Convention, and the community
associations with 46 countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific under the
Lome Convention, all had a discriminatory effect against developing countries outside
these regions. See also DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION 230 (1970).
17. MURRAY, supra note 16. The tariff increased as the degree of processing in-
creased for any given developing country export product. This impeded the growth of
processing industries in the developing countries. Id. These differential tariff structures
also resulted in a high level of protection for the processing industries in developed
countries. Id. Committee III recognized that developing counties were relegated to the
traditional position of suppliers of raw materials. Id.
1991]
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Countries. In 1963, the Programme Action was announced and specific
measures to ameliorate this situation were recognized: a halt on new
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade for products of export interest to
developing countries; elimination of quantitative restrictions by Decem-
ber 31, 1965; duty-free entry of tropical products from developing
countries; and reduction and elimination of tariffs on developing coun-
tries' exports of semi-processed products. 1
8
The Kennedy Round Negotiations (1964-1967) required develop-
ing countries to make some sort of contribution towards trade liberali-
zation. 9 A linear approach was used, requiring all developed countries
to make a 50% "across-the-board cut" in tariffs .2 Agricultural prod-
ucts were not included in the offer, and most developing countries were
allowed to opt out of the linear approach offer. 1 Moreover, each nation
was permitted to file a "table of exceptions list." As a result, agricul-
tural products were negotiated on an item-by-item basis. 2
When the GATT signatories launched the Tokyo Round Negotia-
tions (1973-1979), the world trading system had changed, requiring a
different set of tariff rules.23 The United States industries were facing
grave competition from imports. Protectionist policies of the European
Community and Japan had brought about a growing economic
strength. Thus, tariff reductions on a linear basis were not as favored as
during the Kennedy Round.2 4
The "most favored nation" principle and the "national treatment"
principle are among the most important themes of GATT.2 5 The most
favored nation (MFN) principle, which espouses equality between trad-
ing partners, was never a clear-cut response to the developing countries'
needs. 26 Rather, many argue that it was a tool to promote United
18. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 10-11.
19. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, 4 THAMES ESSAY
45 (1987) [hereinafter Hudec].
20. J.H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 121 (1989) [hereinafter
JACKSON].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Hudec, supra note 19, at 72.
24. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 121.
25. See GOLT, supra note 1, at 3-4. The "most favored nation" principle requires
a contracting state to grant all other members of the agreement the same trade policy
treatment that it grants any other country. Id. at 3. The "national treatment" principle
allows a state to grant preferences to its domestic producers, through the use of a
customs tariff. Id.
26. Hudec, supra note 19, at 6-7.
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States' accessibility to other markets.27
As a result of requests for waivers from the MFN clause, the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences was enacted. 28 In response to these de-
mands, however, the developed countries also requested that a Principle
of Graduation be applied toward those countries that were developing
more rapidly than the rest of the least developed nations.2 9 For exam-
ple, developing countries would contribute toward the framework of
rights and obligations of the GATT when they were economically self-
reliant. No specific provisions or rules were formulated for implement-
ing the graduation principle at that time.3 0
Recent developments in the world economy have prompted a new
round of negotiations - the Uruguay Round. Exchange rate fluctua-
tions and third world debt 31 have been unsettling factors in interna-
tional trade.3 2 The developed countries are faced with ever-increasing
imports from newly developing countries, such as Taiwan, Korea, and
Hong Kong.33 Therefore, it is in the best interests of the developed
countries, particularly the United States, to halt the negative impact of
these unsettling factors on its domestic markets.3 Similarly, the debt-
riddled, least developed countries have a high stake in promoting more
preferential trade through formal GATT rules.
In summary, GATT was established to police "free trade" and lib-
eralize trade barriers among contracting parties. Paradoxically, the
most favored nation principle, non-discrimination among trading part-
ners and reciprocity have, in effect, led to anti-free trade or anti-MFN
rules such as the graduation principle, generalized system of prefer-
ences, voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements,
trading blocs and free trade areas. These are not unexpected, consider-
ing the tension that exists in the division of economic resources between
the developed and the developing countries.
27. Id.
28. T. Frank, Trade Policy Issues of Interest to the Third World, THAMES ESSAY
29 (1981) [hereinafter Frank].
29. Id. at 15.
30. Id.
31. Poor in a Rich Man's World, The Economist, July 22, 1989, at 59 [hereinaf-
ter Poor in a Rich Man's World].
32. GOLT, supra note 1, at 8.
33. Id. at 11-12.
34. Id. at 12.
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II. EXCEPTIONS TO GATT LEGAL STRUCTURE
In 1964, after the establishment of UNCTAD, the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) was implemented. Yet, GSP violated two
of GATT's primary principles - the most-favored nation principle and
the non-discrimination principle. After much debate, contracting par-
ties granted legal authorization to implement the GSP in June 1971 .
35
The method under which the developed countries would grant these
preferences, however, was left to their own discretion. In addition, the
grantor nations (developed countries) determined which countries were
developing countries through highly technical and specialized means.38
The United States used GSP as a means to award its allies and punish
its political opponents, primarily communist and OPEC countries.
At the Tokyo Round negotiations, contracting parties to GATT
adopted a declaration entitled "Differential and More Favorable Treat-
ment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries."-"
This declaration stated that the contracting parties "may accord differ-
ential and more favorable treatment to other contracting parties -not-
withstanding the provisions of the GATT most favored nation
clause."3 8 The declaration instructed developing countries to make
some contribution to the overall GATT legal structure of trade rela-
tions, which reflects the GSP's "graduation requirement."' 39 The decla-
ration also required newly developing countries to exempt themselves
from the GSP scheme or specific areas of coverage if they had benefit-
ted disproportionately from the GSP scheme.
The GSP scheme continues to permit too much leverage in the
hands of the developed countries. It sets a precedent for more discrimi-
natory trade practices in the international trading system.'0 It also fails
to include a number of products which are important sources of export
earnings for developing countries. 1 Moreover, it has regionalized trade
along inefficient lines of production. 2
35. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 17.
36. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 278.
37. Id. at 279.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 16.
41. Id. at 57.
42. Id. This latter point is debatable, because countries such as Singapore, Tai-
wan, Hong Kong, and South Korea may have originally begun their industrialization
process through the manufacture and export of textiles and clothing. These countries
are not endowed with natural resources and have a large labor force. Therefore, indus-
trialization of the sort encouraged by textile industry exports may have been the most
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The most damaging aspect of GATT to the developing countries is
the derogation of the MFN clause, equality of treatment among trad-
ing partners.' 3 Non-reciprocity is not enforced with respect to trade be-
tween developed and developing countries' multilateral trade negotia-
tions. 4 In addition, under the GSP "graduation" requirement, the
ability of the grantors of GSP to withdraw any or all benefits from the
developing countries constitutes a breach of the principle of good
faith."5 The GSP system is extremely weak with respect to the criteria
for designation of its beneficiaries, safeguard mechanisms, rules of ori-
gin, and the definition of product coverage. 6
Although trade for developing countries has increased, the benefits
of the GSP for many developing countries are questionable.' 7 A large
part of GSP excludes import-sensitive products such as textiles, leather,
and most agricultural products.' 8
Because the GSP is a unilateral concession by developed countries,
developd countries have manipulated the rules of origin, ceiling limits,
product categories, and MFN tariff rates to reduce the potential mar-
ket disruption to their respective economies.' 9
Another problem with the GSP is the principle of non-discrimina-
tion among beneficiaries. 50 Donor countries can discriminate among
beneficiaries by broadly defining product coverage or by forming politi-
cal guidelines in their GSP schemes. Discrimination among benefi-
ciaries had to be implemented through general GSP guidelines, not by
conscious selection of beneficiaries based on needs perceived by the
donors.
Consequently, available product coverage has narrowed because
donor countries could modify their product lists to deliberately exclude
efficient line of production available to them at the time.
43. A. YUSEF, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING STATES
115 (1982).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. For example, imports for nations in the OECD between 1976 and 1980 grew
by an average annual rate of 21% compared with 19.6% growth from all sources to
the OECD. JACKSON & DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RE-
LATIONS 1157 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter JACKSON & DAVEY].
48. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 54.
49. See generally id., at 64-70. Two examples of manipulation include Japan's
system of ceilings, and the United States' flexible provisions to revise the list of benefi-
ciaries and product categories.
50. Id. at 37, 61.
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a large number of beneficiaries.5 To remedy this situation, developed
countries should be given the discretion to choose which developing
countries they cover, thereby giving the GSP scheme greater benefits.
5 2
Presently, donor countries find ways to exclude certain legitimate de-
veloping countries. Nevertheless, if each donor country were permitted
to select which developing countries deserved GSP benefits, there would
be two-fold discrimination: exclusion on the bases of ineligibility under
"developing country status" and of "product coverage." The legal con-
cept of tariff preferences has been embodied in the Global System of
Trade Preferences (GSTP).5 s Although this concept was conceived dur-
ing the 1971 Protocol Relating to Trade Negotiations Among Develop-
ing Countries, UNCTAD has only recently discussed its potential ap-
plication. 54 The GSTP is intended to facilitate "an equitable
distribution of benefits to all participating parties."55 The UNCTAD
scheme proposes a linear tariff cut of 10 % whereas developed countries
would be permitted to cut tariffs by only 5 %. These tariff reductions
would only apply to products from other developing countries." De-
pending on the level of development of each country, the developing
countries could either reduce tariffs or raise MFN tariffs (with appro-
priate GATT waivers) to bring the entire tariff structure to as equita-
ble a scheme as possible. 7
Theoretically, the GSTP system is an equitable solution to dispari-
ties between trading partners, particularly where tariffs are concerned.
Nevertheless, the current trend is toward active protectionism among
most developed countries and institutionalized barriers to trade in de-
veloping countries. Thus, even if the GSTP scheme is fully imple-
mented, benefits to all those participating could be negligible.
A. International Commodity Agreements
International commodity agreements are formulated to protect
commodity exports between governments which derogate the principles
of the Multi-Fibre Agreement and non-discrimination among states
embodied in GATT.58 These include a "special class" of trade agree-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Hudec, supra note 19, at 108.
54. Id. at 109.
55. Id. at 110.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIY AGREEMENTS: A LEGAL STUDY
34-36 (1987).
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ments which "segregate a given commodity for special handling under
special rules and arrangements going beyond and departing from those
governing the generality of goods." 9 Developing country members of
GATT have classified these specific commodity agreements as excep-
tions found in Article XX of GATT."
The International Commodity Agreements are acceptable under
GATT as long as they do not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries or are disguised restrictions on interna-
tional trade.6 Certain GATT articles have been interpreted to permit
the operation of International Commodity Agreements, in particular
Article XI, which allows quantitative import/export restrictions for
governmental and economic structural purposes; Article XII, which
permits import restrictions for balance of payments reasons; and Arti-
cle XXV, which permits contracting parties to waive a GATT obliga-
tion by a two-thirds majority vote.62
International Commodity Agreements are designed to bring about
price stabilization, export income stabilization, and long-term commod-
ity development measures. However, they continue to create carteliza-
tion6" and trade regionalization. The New International Economic Or-
der recognizes these agreements as a major part of their program.6 4
Whether or not they can be legitimately regarded as part of GATT's
multilateral "free trade" oriented scheme is yet to be seen.
59. Id. at 33.
60. These exceptions read:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to pre-
vent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any inter-governmental
commodity agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the Con-
tracting Parties and not disapproved by them, or which is itself so submitted
and not so disapproved.
See id. at 35.
61. Id. at 35-36.
62. Id. at 36-37. Some of the International Commodity Agreements which could
have been established under the above guidelines include the Internatioanl Coffee
Agreement (1976 and 1983); International Sugar Agreement (1977 and 1984); Inter-
national Natural Rubber Agreement (1979); International Olive Oil Agreement
(1979); International Cocoa Agreement (1980); International Tin Agreement (1981);
International Agreement on Jute and Jute Products (1982); International Tropical
Timber Agreement (1983); and the International Wheat Agreement (1986).
63. See id. at 45-50.
64. Id. at 127.
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B. The Multi-Fibre Agreement
Developed countries have been successful in promoting and imple-
menting devices which minimize tariff structures and restrain imports
from developing countries. 69 The Multi-Fibre Agreement, which regu-
lates textiles and related trade, is a classic example of this type of
device.
The Multi-Fibre Agreement began when several developing coun-
tries started to excel in textile and garment industry exports. As early
as 1956, the United States requested Japan to curb its textile exports.
In 1959, industry to industry quotas were established between the
United Kingdom and Hong Kong, India, and Pakistan. 6 In 1961 and
1962, the Short-Term Arrangements on textiles were formulated, fol-
lowed by a succession of Long-Term Agreements which continued until
1973.67 The Long-Term Agreements were replaced by the Multi-Fibre
Agreement in 1974, which was extended until. 1978. The third Multi-
Fibre Agreement came into effect in 1986 and expires in 1991.8
Initially, these agreements focused only on cotton and related tex-
tiles, but they now include silk, ramie, jute, sisal, abaca, and maguey,
among others.6 9 These agreements permit government intervention in
regulating imports of textiles, particularly in the developed countries. It
has been suggested that developed countries with overly protected tex-
tile industries should dismantle the industry and divert the labor and
capital to more productive enterprises. 70 It is doubtful, however, that
the political constituencies of the developed countries, particularly the
United States, will adopt such a policy.
The Multi-Fibre Agreement is a derogation of GATT. Techni-
cally, it is in accord with GATT because paragraph 6 of Article I of
the Multi-Fibre Agreement states that it does not affect the rights and
obligations of the participants under GATT.7 This, however, is a con-
tradiction in terms. The Multi-Fibre Agreement legalizes quantitative
restrictions and replaces GATT's Most Favored Nation principles with
65. Orderly Marketing Arrangements (OMAs) and Voluntary Trade Restraints
(VERs) are two of these devices.
66. D. TUSSLE, THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYS-
TEM: A CHALLENGE TO THE GATT 4 (1987) [hereinafter TuSSLE].
67. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 181.
68. Id.
69. TUSSLE, supra note 66, at 67.
70. Note, Textiles and Apparel Trade Liberalization: The Need for a Strategic
Change in Free Trade, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 205-225 (1989).
71. H.R. ZHENG, LEGAL STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 93 (1988) [here-
inafter ZHENG].
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the Multi-Fibre Agreement selective application of quantitative restric-
tions.72 Furthermore, it requires that Multi-Fibre Agreement con-
tracting parties (exporters of textiles) not assert GATT rights, such as
retaliatory measures, for the quantitative restrictions imposed upon the
parties.73 In addition, the developed countries, who generally import
these products, may actually limit their imports without demonstrating
the existence of "serious injury" or a "threat of serious injury" as re-
quired by GATT Article XIX.74 Despite this feature, contracting par-
ties may resort to compensatory or retaliatory remedies under GATT
Article XXIII. 75
Multi-Fibre Agreements may create incentives for developing
countries to diversify when exports stagnate.7 6 However, the practical
effect of the Multi-Fibre Agreements has been to perpetuate the newly
developing countries' 77 leverage in the textile field at the expense of less
developed countries which are trying to create a niche in the market. 78
The Mutli-Fibre Agreements have also raised the price of textiles and
clothing by 15 % to 40%. This extra income has not been evenly dis-
tributed among developing countries. Instead, it has benefited a select
few newly industrialized countries. 79 Thus, the newly industrialized
countries and the major developed countries may extend the MFA's
beyond 1991 because it is in their best interests to do so.80
C. Regional Preference Systems
The current level of protectionism, the general deterioration of the
economies of major powers, and the preference systems have led the
way towards increased bilateralism and regionalism.81 GATT recog-
nizes regional trading as an exception to the MFN principle. 8 For ex-
72. Id. at 93-94; see also I. LITTLE, T. SEITOVSKY & M. SCOTT, INDUSTRY
TRADE IN SOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 278-280 (1970).
73. ZHENG, supra note 71, at 93-94.
74. Id. at 93.
75. Id. at 105.
76. D.B. KEESIG & M. WOLF, TEXTILE QUOTAS AGAINST DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 124 (1980); see also, TUSSLE, supra note 66, at 67-69.
77. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea.
78. TUSSLE, supra note 66, at 131. For example, when the European Community
imposed heavy quotas against Sri Lanka when it was beginning to enter the world
textile and garment market. Id.
79. See TUSSLE, supra note 66, at 95.
80. See generally, Poor in a Rich Man's World, supra note 31, at 59.
81. Koopermann, Reorganization or Disorganization of the World Economy?, In-
tereconomics, Jan./Feb. 1989, at 11 [hereinafter Koopermann].
82. GATT Secretariat, GATT Activities 1988 (1989) [hereinafter GATT
1991]
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ample, the European Community (EC) has been a major regional bloc
for nearly three decades and may become a fortress after European
economic integration occurs in 1992. One major area in which the EC
has been extremely successful is in its Common Agricultural Policy.
Under this policy, tariffs charged on most foreign agricultural goods
vary frequently to the disadvantage of foreign agricultural imports that
may have leverage within the EC. This variable tariff structure has
insulated the EC's agricultural sector from foreign competition, and in
effect, defeated the basic policies behind GATT's preference for tariffs
as a trade restriction."3
The Association of South East Asian Nations, another exception
to the MFN principle, has been effective in encouraging bilateral trade
among its members. In addition, the proposed Australasian trading
bloc and the newly formed South Asian Association of Regional Coop-
eration may carve out more trade protectionist trading blocs. The
United States has also attempted to promote trade, economic invest-
ment, and tax incentives in the Caribbean region. 84
The current trend toward trade regionalization should be discour-
aged because of its deleterious effect upon the GATT multilateral trade
rules.8 5 The success of these regional groupings comes at the early
stages when imports from the region are substituted for non-bloc com-
modities. 88 However, when trade diversion is complete and the pace of
regional production is geared solely towards the growth of the domestic
gross national product, their value as a trade mechanism becomes mar-
ginal. 87 These systems also cause inefficient production structures and
accentuate income disparities within the bloc of those nations of those
nations that are at different developmental stages. 8
Secretariat].
83. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 131; see also Filipek, Agriculture in a World of
Comparative Advantage: The Prospects for Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay
Round of GATT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 123, 133 (1989).
84. From the outset, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1982 has
encountered obstacles in its implementation, because the United States has applied pro-
tectionist measures against sugar imports, a major export of the Caribbean nations.
Note, Interaction of the Caribbean Basin Initiative and U.S. Domestic Sugar Price
Support: A Political Contradiction, 8 Miss. C.L. REv. 198-205 (1988).
85. Koopermann, supra note 81, at 11.
86. Frank, supra note 28, at 46.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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D. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties constitute another set of
trade regulating devices which affect developing countries. Dumping is
usually defined as selling commodities at a lower price in one national
market than in another, such as selling below the seller's home market
price or below cost. 89 GATT recognized this trade practice during the
Kennedy Round Negotiations and formulated provisions under Article
VI, which allow contracting parties to use anti-dumping duties to offset
the margin of dumped goods.90 The Anti-Dumping Code was renegoti-
ated during the Tokyo Round and the new Anti-Dumping Code came
into effect in 1980.91
The Anti-Dumping Code does not require contracting parties to
refrain from dumping. 92 Nor does it bind individual firms and persons
in contracting states to cease dumping. The Anti-dumping Code merely
allows the affected states to apply anti-dumping duties, provided they
can show that the dumping causes or threatens to cause "material in-
jury" to competing domestic industries." The United States, the Euro-
pean Economic Community, Australia, and Canada rely most heavily
on the anti-dumping laws.94 Through loopholes in GATT, these coun-
tries have adopted protectionist and trade restrictive anti-dumping
laws.98 Indeed, some political leaders in developed countries consider
dumping a criminal or tortious act, 96 and argue for a "private right of
action."
Anti-dumping duties adversely affect developing countries which
try to gain access to larger markets, such as the United States and the
EC. Countries manipulate these duties to assist special interest groups
such as competing domestic industries or producers. 97 In order to avoid
potential adverse exposure, these minor, but competitive exporters
(usually developing countries), may refrain from entering markets
where anti-dumping duties are assessed in a protectionist manner. Any
hope for liberal trade practices are thereby thwarted.
GATT should refine its Anti-Dumping Code and add several ele-
89. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 47, at 654.
90. Id. at 225-26.
91. GATT Secretariat, supra note 82, at 115.
92. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 227.
93. Id. at 225-26.
94. E.A. VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 698-702 (1987) [hereinafter VERMULST].
95. Id. at 702.
96. Id.
97. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 219.
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ments to the "material injury test," including proof of the industry's
typical practice98 and a requirement that the injured domestic industry
show that they have not engaged in dumping. 9
Most developing countries do not consider dumping to be an ad-
verse action, particularly because it results in lower costs for goods in
their own economies. 100 However, anti-dumping duties, as well as coun-
tervailing duties, tend to adversely affect the trade shares of-developing
countries rather than those of developed countries.
The GATT signatories negotiated the Subsidies Code during the
Tokyo Round. The Subsidies Code permits the application of counter-
vailing duties to imports in order to neutralize any advantage the ex-
porter may gain through domestic or import subsidies. 101 Counter-
vailing duties are used in nearly the same manner as anti-dumping
duties, namely, to protect local industries or producers from foreign
competition. The effects of countervailing duties on developing coun-
tries are similar to those of anti-dumping duties. Countervailing duties
may amount to trade harassment, particularly when there is no evi-
dence of either subsidies or damage to the importing country. 02 The
United States was accountable for 90% of the countervailing duties
imposed during the 1980s,111 indicating that the developed countries
are the more aggressive users of countervailing duties against develop-
ing country exporters. Some observers propose that anti-dumping and
countervailing duty provisions be subject to an international panel to
determine which duties are legitimate under the "material injury
test. 104
In sum, exceptions to the GATT legal framework, particularly the
Multi-Fibre Agreement's, regional blocs, and anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duties, have an adverse impact upon developing countries.
Moreover, the benefits of the GSP scheme are frequently questioned.
Currently, protectionism plays a major role in world trade. The GSP
system and the Multi-Fibre Agreement have established the ground-
work for similar protectionist forces in contravention to the GATT le-
gal structure.
98. VERMULST, supra note 94, at 709.
99. See generally, id.
100. Id. at 703.
101. GATT Secretariat, supra note 82, at 48.
102. Id. at 47.
103. Id. at 117.
104. J.M. FINGER, THE URUGUAY ROUND - A HANDBOOK FOR THE MULTILAT-
ERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 153, 158-59 (ed. J.M. Finger & A. Olechowski) (1987).
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III. GATT LEGAL POLICY AND THE POLITICAL FORCES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
GATT has not been the only force in stabilizing the world eco-
nomic system. Political forces within the developing countries have also
contributed to the impact of the GATT upon developing countries.
Most developing countries have managed to obtain a "no-obliga-
tions policy"'with GATT."°5 In other words, they can place high tariffs
against imports and devise import quotas, export retention quotas, and
import entitlement programs in order to protect infant industries and
encourage economic development. 10 Developing countries with success-
ful industries, however, face pressure from developed nations to restrain
exports and export-oriented developmental programs. Therefore, it is
difficult for many developing countries to adhere to the GATT in a
systematic manner.
For many developing countries, GATT has had a marginal impact
on internal policy. Even if developing countries attempted to liberalize
trade barriers, there would be immense opposition from import-substi-
tute and traditional export-oriented trading groups. 01 Therefore, most
developing countries do not feel a need to dismantle protectionist trade
barriers. If GATT became more binding, Third World governments
might be forced to comply with international legal obligations.
Sri Lanka illustrates this situation. Sri Lanka's experiment in
trade liberalization ended in a dismal failure, partly because of the pro-
tectionist political forces within the country and the inability of the
economy to manage "free trade" forces." 8 In 1977, the government of
Sri Lanka made a conscious effort to liberalize trade. The government
removed quantitative restrictions and assessed nominal tariffs on an ad
valorem basis. 09 The government also dismantled pervasive exchange
control systems." 0 However, the world market price of Sri Lanka's
commodity exports such as, tea, rubber, and coconut, continued to de-
cline steadily.
Sri Lanka's trade liberalization policies have encountered many
problems, as did trade liberalization in other developing countries. The
major impediment to a smooth transition from protectionism to non-
105. Hudec, supra note 19, at 159.
106. See generally, A. RUBNER, THE EXPORT CULT, 149-52 (1987).
107. Hudec, supra note 19, at 161-63.
108. Lal and Rajapatirana, Impediments to Trade Liberalization in Sri Lanka,
THAMES ESSAY 51 (1989).
109. Id. at 27.
110. Id. at 26.
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protectionism has been the overall structure of the economy. State-run
enterprises have been an inefficient force in the Sri Lankan economy
for over two decades. Additionally, politically powerful import-substi-
tute sectors have encouraged the government to be cautious in the dis-
mantlement of the protectionist forces."1 '
The role of GATT in these domestic policies was negligible, and it
is unlikely that GATT would have been able to coerce the government
of Sri Lanka to adopt a more comprehensive trade liberalization pol-
icy.112 Even though developing country members may officially adopt
GATT rules, the political constituency that usually governs developing
countries determines trade or development policies. Thus, in imple-
menting rules, internal political and social forces play a substantial role
in effecting trade policy.
IV. URUGUAY ROUND PROPOSALS
The Uruguay Round negotiations present developing countries
with an opportunity to negotiate favorable GATT rules. Whether the
results of negotiations will receive political acceptance in their respec-
tive countries remains to be seen. The Uruguay Round was initiated by
the Ministerial Declaration at Punta del Este in 1986. The proposals
submitted at the Uruguay Round are worth noting, particularly those
regarding agricultural products, textiles, and tariffs, because they may
influence developing countries' trade activities in the foreseeable future.
A. Tariff Proposals
Tariff escalation, tariff peaks, low "nuisance" tariffs, and the need
to increase the level of bindings (fixing of duties in GATT against fu-
ture increases) have caused tariffs to be a primary point of discussion
in the Uruguay Round.
The United States has proposed a primary program of tariff cuts
in order to improve access to markets, but insists that these concessions
must be matched by the United States' major trading partners, namely
Japan and the European Community. 1' 3 The United States has also
proposed a case-by-case approach to tariff reductions. Smaller trading
partners, as well as the EC, are concerned that the United States may
11. For example, only the nominal tariff rates were reduced in the late 1970s.
See generally id. at 27.
112. See generally, Slip Sliding Away, The Economist, May 27, 1989, at 38.
113. Japan Submits Proposals on Tariff at GA TT Trade Talks (Daily Report for
Executives March 21, 1990) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Nwsltrs file) [hereinafter Japan
Proposals].
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use this method to gain bargaining strength with respect to agricultural
products and the textile industry.'1 4
The EC, on the other hand, has proposed an average industrial cut
on tariffs from 5.44% to 3.86%."1 The EC's tariff proposal is com-
posed of three parts: (1) a detailed illustration of a tariff line-by-line
basis of base rates and reductions after the application of the EC
formula, (2) a summary showing the duty structure and the average
duties before and after the application of the formula, and (3) a calcu-
lation of the impact of the EC formula on duties of 0.5% and above." 6
In addition, the EC proposes tarriff cuts of 100% on tropical products
and raw materials, 25 % on semifinished tropical products, and 50 % on
finished tropical products." 7 The EC proposal also includes reductions
on tropical drink tariffs, such as coffee, cocoa, and tea. In this area, the
EC is requesting concessions from its major trading partners, in partic-
ular, Japan and the United States."'
The Japanese proposal calls for a tariff cut well beyond the one-
third limit."" The proposed tariff reduction covers 6,800 products and
urges the implementation of reductions prior to the end of the Uruguay
Round.12 0 The United States responded to the Japanese proposal by
recommending an even higher tariff reduction amounting to 67 % .2'
B. Agricultural and Tropical Products
Agriculture has been another focus of the Uruguay Round. The
United States proposed eventual elimination of all subsidies over a five-
year period and conversion of non-tariff barriers into tariffs. In addi-
tion, the European Community is willing to "re-balance" existing sup-
ports, shifting agricultural protection to sectors where it is now weak.
22
The United States Department of Agriculture indicates that farm sup-
ports cost $165 billion annually in developed countries alone. 2 3 It has
114. EC Submits Detailed Uruguay Round Proposal for Across-the-Board Re-
ductions in Tariffs, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 262 (Feb. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Reduc-
tions]; Meetings in Tokyo Attempt to Lay Plans for Final Year of Uruguay Round, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1514 (Nov. 14, 1989) [hereinafter Tokyo].
115. Tokyo, supra note 114.
116. Reductions, supra note 114, at 262.
117. Japan Proposals, supra note 113.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Negotiators Press for Changes in the Last Year of the Uruguay Round
(Daily Report for Executives January 17, 1990) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Nwltrs file).
123. See Reductions, supra note 114.
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been estimated that the EC and the United States account for 40% of
all farm exports in the world market.
The United States is heavily dependent upon export markets for
two-thirds of its wheat production and more than one-half of its cotton
and other grains.2 4 Therefore, it is pressing vigorously for lower tariffs
with little or no subsidies on agriculture. However, not all farmers in
the United States support the U.S. proposals at the Uruguay Round.
For example, the sugar and dairy sectors and the National Farmer's
Union, supported by the 3.8 million member American Farm Bureau
Federation, have expressed concern over the proposals. 125
Japan has proposed to phase out farm supports, export subsidies,
and import tariffs.126 It has not, however, agreed to dismantle its ban
on the importation of rice, Japan's staple food, which is heavily subsi-
dized by the Japanese governmens. 27
The Philippines has called for special and preferential treatment
for developing countries with respect to agriculture. In addition, it also
wants reductions or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers for
Philippine agricultural-based products.1 28
Australia's support programs for agriculture have also been at-
tacked during the latest negotiations. Here, objections have been raised
as to certain content requirements and standards, as well as health,
quarantine and safety requirements.12 9 Some of these subsidized sectors
are of particular interest to the developing countries, which have re-
quested that Australia phase out its protectionist policies for agricul-
tural producte. 130 However, compared to most other developed coun-
tries which have adopted the MFN principle, Australia has a minimal
amount of bilateral trade. 31
Tropical products have received much attention from the develop-
ing countries at the Uruguay Round. As a result, the EC has proposed
124. See The Fifteen Negotiating Groups of the Uruguay Round, 7 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 88 (Jan. 17, 1990) [hereinafter Groups].
125. Remarks by Carla Hills, US Trade Representative, to the National Associa-
tion of State Departments of Agriculture (Federal News Service March 12, 1990)
(LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file).
126. Groups, supra note 124.
127. Japan asserts that its policy of food security must be maintained. Tokyo,
supra note 114.
128. Philippines States its Position on GATT Talks (Xinhua General Overseas
News Service, March 19, 1990) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file).
129. Australia's Trade Policy Critisised at GATT Council Trade Review Ses-
sion, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1662 (Dec. 20, 1989).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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a annual tariff cut of 35% to 100% on imports of tropical products
worth 10.4 billion European Currency Units ($12.5 billion in U.S. cur-
rency). 18 The EC has proposed to eliminate duties on unprocessed ag-
ricultural products such as coffee, industrial raw materials, and cut tar-
iffs on semi-finished products.1"' The EC has also agreed to reduce
internal taxes on beverages such as coffee, tea, and cocoa progressively,
if the other trading partners, particularly Brazil and Colombia, can
clearly prove that these taxes affect their trade. 3
Developing countries have voiced concerns over the use of GATT's
Article XIX, which provides for protective action in emergency situa-
tions. The developing countries maintain that this practice limits their
agricultural and tropical products' access to developed country mar-
kets.135 Viewed as way to circumvent the most favored nation require-
ment, developing countries' main objective is to secure increased access
to developed country markets and to reduce tariffs for processed tropi-
cal and agricultural products. Whether any of these proposals will be
adopted depends on the United States' willingness to reach a compro-
mise with the EC on its reduction of subsidies.
C. Textiles and Clothing
Negotiations concerning textiles and clothing have created contro-
versy. The success of the Uruguay Round negotiations depends heavily
on whether the developed and developing countries can agree on how to
bring textiles and clothing within the GATT rules. For example, a re-
cent World Bank study has urged the developed countries to "scrap
curbs on Third World textile exports."1 ' The study proposes the dis-
mantlement of all the import bans on developing country textile im-
ports. This, however, will cost the developing countries $8 billion per
year in lost export earnings by the year 2000.137 The developing coun-
tries support this policy because textiles are the first step towards
132. EC Tables Tropical Products Offer at GATT Talks, (The Reuter Library
Report March 16, 1990) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Nwsltrs file).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Developing Countries Uneasy Over Progress of Uruguay Round, U.N. Says,
(Daily Report for Executives October 11, 1989) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Nwsltrs
file).
136. Scrap Curbs on Third World Textile Exports, World Bank Study Says
(The Reuter Library Report March 14, 1990) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Nwsltrs file)
(hereinafter Scrap].
137. Id.
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industrialization. 1
3 8
The developing countries insist that the Multi-Fibre Arrangement
be completely dismantled immediately or phased out. They argue that
voluntary trade restraints cost developed country consumers an addi-
tional $10 billion per year. 39 Thus, if the Multi-Fibre Agreement were
to be dismantled, the developing countries would gain at least $3 billion
per year. "
Fearing that their needs would be ignored in the final agreement
reached at the Uruguay Round, " developing countries are concerned
that the emerging open market economies in Eastern Europe might
squeeze their share of textile exports from the EC market within the
next decade.'4 2 Textile prices may fall as a result, and the least devel-
oping countries, particularly, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Angola may
suffer in the process. 3
The United States, Canada, the EC, and Japan are at an impasse
on the issue of textiles and additional "free trade" rules.4 4 The United
States and Canada prefer a global quota system with a short transition
period from the voluntary export restraint arrangement to most favored
nation rules."' The global quota system is not without cost to the de-
veloping countries. According to the United States International Trade
Administration, the United States textile and apparel industries use a
system of quota protection and high duty rates, over six times higher
than the average tariff on all other imports. This existing system of
quotas is estimated to cost the American economy between $11.7 bil-
lion and $13.1 billion per year.146
Canada supports the United States proposal generally, but favors
a more flexible approach. Canada proposes terminating all measures
inconsistent with GATT (including those under the Multi-Fibre Agree-
ment), and requiring that Article XIX Safeguards to be used to protect
138. Id.
139. Brezina, Textile Quotas Cost Developing Countries Billions (Proprietary to
the United Press International March 14, 1990) (LEXIS, NEXIS, Wires file).
140. Id.
141. Canada Fails to Break Deadlock Over Textiles at GATT Negotiations, 7
Int' Trade Rep. (BNA) 339 (March 7, 1990) [hereinafter Deadlock].
142. Scrap, supra note 136.
143. See id.
144. Percival, Trade: Differences Abound Over Moving Textiles Sector into
GATT (Inter Press Service, March 9, 1990) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file)
[hereinafter Percival].
145. Id.
146. Importers Press Bush Administration to Submit Textiles Proposal at
GATT, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1441 (Nov. 8, 1990).
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injured countries against "market disruption" during the transition
from Multi-Fibre Agreement to GATT rules. 4" Additionally, Canada
proposes that the range of products covered by the mechanism should
be progressively reduced. Canada further argues that any restrictions
imposed under the safeguard mechanism should be subject to minimum
growth. 48
The EC favors the inclusion of textiles under GATT rules, but
recommends a very long "phase out period." The EC also advocates the
opening of markets for raw materials and similar goods and the lower-
ing of tariffs in Third World countries.' 49 The EC proposes an overall
safeguard system under GATT to protect industries faced with difficul-
ties in adapting to the gradual abolition of the Multi-Fibre Agree-
ment, 50 and insists that the other GATT members be granted recipro-
cal access to developing countries' markets.'5'
Nevertheless, developing countries are reluctant to dismantle their
protectionist trade policies. They argue that global quotas restrain the
totality of imports and create tougher competition between suppliers.1
2
They also argue that the competition would be of limited value because
the proportion of restricted imports would be very high with respect to
developing countries. 15' They urge developed nations to continue to
grant developing countries differential and most favored treatment.
The treatment of textile and clothing industries present the most
controversial issue at the Uruguay Round. The developed countries
want to extend the Multi-Fibre Agreement or replace it with a similar
protectionist system, while the developing countries want full-scale dis-
mantlement of the Multi-Fibre Agreement. It is conceivable that the
textile and agricultural trade liberalization issues will determine the
outcome of the agreement reached at the Uruguay Round.
V. THE FUTURE ROLE OF GATT
The negotiating parties at the Uruguay Round, as in previous mul-
tilateral trade negotiations, have failed to take into account the diver-
gent needs of its. economically differentiated membership in formulat-
ing comprehensive trade policies. For example, negotiating parties
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Percival, supra note 144.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Deadlock, supra note 143.
153. Id.
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cannot continue to categorize the developing countries as one homoge-
neous group. Instead, they should be classified as newly developing
countries, less developed countries, and least developed countries.""
Before formulating trade policies, it is important for contracting parties
to categorize the various members of GATT according to their stage of
development, gross national product, trade surplus or deficit, and gen-
eral standard of living. While it is difficult to compartmentalize a mem-
ber country into a particular category, some superficial compartmental-
ization is necessary to create better trade rules.
In the current Uruguay Round, most developed nations want to
perpetuate restrictive trade policies, national farm subsidies in the case
of agriculture and tropical products, and the Multi-Fibre Agreement,
with respect to the textile trade. GATT's most favored nation principle
does not seem to be a catalyst in the current negotiations.
Comparative advantage and trade interdependency should be ac-
knowledged and accepted as a realistic phenomena in today's commer-
cial world. By preventing voluntary export restraints and orderly mar-
keting arrangements, developed countries would gain in the long-term.
Exporting Third World nations would receive more revenue and be
able to purchase technology and products from the developed countries,
and consequently, generate export earnings for the developed world.
GATT rules should be binding on all contracting parties. Singling
out those countries that most frequently circumvent GATT's legal poli-
cies should be a part of GATT's enforcement mechanism. At times,
developed and developing countries alike have deviated from GATT
rules or created bilateral or trilateral arrangements outside of GATT
because GATT rules were seen as harmful to their interests.
The Uruguay Round could be a catalyst for the developed and
developing worlds to reach a consensus that trade rules be beneficial to
all, not just a few select members. Developed nations should also real-
ize that the longer developing countries remain economically disadvan-
taged, the longer it will take for them to repay debts owed to developed
countries. International trade is a means for these developing countries
to earn foreign exchange to repay those debts owed to developed coun-
tries and purchase capital and consumer goods for further development.
In the past, the most powerful GATT signatories gained leverage in
adjusting the trade rules to suit their needs. In the future, GATT
154. Cooper, Exporters Versus Importers: LDC's, Agricultural Trade, and the
Uruguay Round, Intereconomics 13 (Jan./Feb. 1990). In the area of agriculture and
tropical products, the developing countries can be categorized under the Cairns group,
which has some middle income developing countries, the Food Importer's group, and
export-oriented developing countries, particularly with respect to tropical products.
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should move from a power-oriented to a rule-oriented system 65 to pro-
mote the progress of developing countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
GATT has never been viewed as the champion of developing coun-
tries. While UNCTAD was created as a counter-organization to deal
with the bias of GATT against developing countries, GATT has not
been able to create more favorable trading policies for developing coun-
tries. Instead, the Generclized System of Preferences scheme has been
beneficial to only a few developing countries. On the whole, the Gener-
clized System of Preferences has favored political allies of specific in-
dustrialized groups; a classic example of neo-colonialism. Furthermore,
because the bargaining power of developing countries has been negligi-
ble under GATT, the ability of developing countries to promote trade
or reduce trade barriers for themselves has been minimal.
If GATT is to be effective in promoting "free trade," it will have
to create neutral safeguard mechanisms against contracting parties
with a protectionist bias. It is arguable whether the developing or the
developed countries will find this legal policy acceptable. GATT should
also take into account the reality of the world trading system and the
inequities that exist in various countries when applying these policies.
Contracting parties should, in effect, acknowledge GATT's inap-
plicability to today's trade regimes. Lower tariffs and fewer or no quan-
titative restrictions are certainly desirable. Nevertheless, there are po-
litical ramifications attached to dismantling trade barriers. If, for
instance, developing countries were to completely dismantle trade bar-
riers, the internal economic inequities would likely be sharper, causing
political instability. If the political situation becomes unstable as a re-
sult of trade or financial liberalization policies, the economy, as a
whole, might deteriorate, and the developing county's government
might revert back to protectionist policies.
GATT should revise its fundamental principles, most favored na-
tion status and non-discrimination, and adopt a tiered system applica-
ble to four main economic categories: developed, newly developing, de-
veloping, and less-developed countries. Trade policies should be geared
towards a particular nation depending upon its economic classification.
The relative strength of each country's sectors should also be taken into
account. When a nation develops economically and becomes a develop-
ing rather than a less-developed country, GATT should re-classify it
155. Nicolaides, Safeguards and the Problem of VERs, Intereconomics 22-24
(Jan./Feb. 1990).
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and require the country to take on more obligations and
responsibilities.
Under the present system, GATT encourages elaborate mecha-
nisms for negotiations and procedures which are counterproductive.
GATT should include a mechanism to enforce retaliatory economic
sanctions if any contracting party refuses to abide by trading rules. Un-
less GATT can revise its policies to account for the diverse trading
capabilities of the contracting parties, it will continue to be a pawn in
the hands of developed countries.
